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The Political Offense Exception
as Applied in French Cases Dealing
with the Extradition of Terrorists
The Quest for an Appropriate
Doctrinal Analysis Revisited
Thomas E. Carbonneau*
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The hijacking of three commercial aircraft in Venezuela and of a Libyan
airliner in Rome on December 7, 1981, 1 and the even more recent kidnapping of General Dozier in Italy by Red Brigade terrorists 2 constitute an
unmistakable and forceful illustration that acts of terrorism 3-allegedly
committed to further the ends of a political cause-continue to plague the
stability and security of the international legal order. 4 There is no doubt
that terrorism is a dangerous, costly and complex problem. Commentators
have speculated extensively about its ideological character and other analysts have studied its sociological roots and psychological origins, 5 Despite
all this attention, there is a lack of consensus in the international community about whether terrorism is no more than a sensational form of criminality or a legitimate mode of political expression. 6
This article does not attempt to deal with all of the multifarious aspects
of contemporary terrorism; its ambition is much more modest in scope,
centering upon traditional legal mechanisms and doctrines that can be
adapted to deal with terrorism. Using the decisional law of France as an
illustrative model, this article analyzes the transnational and political character of terrorist acts and seeks to establish the implications of those
characteristics for litigation dealing with the extradition of terrorist
offenders. Several assumptions underlie the analysis. First, the effort to
repress international crime is seen as a laudable objective of the interna* Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the Eason-Weinmann Center of
Comparative Law, Tulane University School of Law.
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tional legal order and cooperation among nations. Second, concomitantly,
terrorism-political or otherwise-is perceived as a significantly disruptive
form of criminality, the continued presence and growth of which must be
curtailed. Finally, the view that terrorist acts constitute a non-criminal
means of expressing dissenting political opinions is deemed to be an untenable position-at least in terms of the articulation of applicable legal
norms and the elaboration of applicable juridical standards.
With these assumptions in mind, this article examines the role of the
French judiciary in creating standards for international judicial cooperation
in the process of extraditing alleged terrorist offenders. The chief inquiry
centers upon whether terrorist acts should be characterized as political
offenses, thereby exempting their perpetrators from extradition. 7 Given
the international efforts to create consensus in this area 8 and the extensive
executive branch discretion in the process of extradition, 9 do the courts
function as the standard-bearers of stability and consistency, allowing
juridical norms to guide-and perhaps unravel-the web of political determinations?
Following a line of previous studies, 10 this article considers the French
example, and its successes and failures in bringing legal sanctions to bear
against terrorists. Until now, commentators have focused on the decisions
of the Cour d'appel of Paris that related to celebrated cases involving the
extradition of terrorists or would-be terrorists whose activities attracted
worldwide attention. 11 The present study attempts to reorient previous
efforts by engaging in a more comprehensive study of the French jurisprudence and the French national policy on terrorism and the repression of
international crime. The Paris court opinions are integrated into a wider
judicial context and are compared to executive branch pronouncements in
this area. Finally, this datum is assessed to determine whether, given the
political underpinnings of this litigation, the courts can curb political pressure adequately and maintain the integrity of doctrine, articulating juridical norms which create a consistent framework for resolving these
controversies and providing the international legal order with a muchneeded sense of stability.

THE CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA
The extradition of terrorist offenders engenders a nearly intractable doctrinal problem: articulating a viable definition of the notion of "terrorism"
and the concept of "political offense." The difficulty of definition resides
in part in the fact that the two terms overlap to some extent; it may well
be impossible to articulate a conceptually suitable and functional definition of either term without first defining the other. Moreover, an abstract
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definition may be entirely unworkable from the vantage point of prosecution and judicial application since the meaning of the two notions is largely
dependent upon the special circumstances of the specific cases. Finally
defining the role of the political offense exception in litigation dealing with
the extradition of terrorist offenders translates the ideological rift between
various areas of the world which are dominated by opposing political
creeds and which have attained various levels and stages of economic

development

12

For purposes of extradition and the international repression of crime,
terrorist acts, once they are perpetrated across national boundaries or flight
is taken to countries other than target nations, become problematic precisely because of the would-be motivation that underlies them. The political offense exception long has been recognized as a means by which to
afford refuge to potential extraditees who otherwise would be persecuted
for their political beliefs and actions in the requesting State. 13 It translates
a humanitarian concern: the legitimacy of political beliefs should not be
determined according to whether the acts to which they give rise succeed
or fail in establishing a new political regime in the requesting State. 14
The method of establishing judicially the political character of an act
has been the subject of an extensive debate and various methodologies
have been proposed. 15 The recourse to assassination to bring about a
change in political regime, for example, traditionally has been excluded
from the purview of the political offense exception. 16 Nineteenth and-to
some extent-twentieth century courts sometimes have required that the
act take place in the context of an on-going two-party struggle for
power. 17 A discredited line of decisional law once limited the political
offense exception to purely political crimes, such as treason. 18 Yet other
methodologies had the courts engage in a balancing process, weighing the
various circumstances of the case to arrive at an ad hoc characterization of
the "predominate" character of the act involved. 19 Finally, the recognized
limitations on the exception were sometimes disregarded in cases of flight
from totalitarian regimes. 20
The political offense exception was born of special and by-gone historical factors and translated an aspiration toward freedom of political expression and actions. 21 Even the courts of that period, however, were
quick-for example, in the case of anarchists 22 -to introduce restrictions
upon the new immunity, to mix aspiration with reality and to establish a
sensible and functional balance between freedom of political activity and
expression and the need to repress criminality. The question becomes one
of determining whether this doctrinal heritage still retains a semblance of
contemporary relevance and, if so, what limitations should be imposed
upon it to respond to the vexed question of the nature of terrorist acts and
their juridical qualification.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CIVILIAN SYSTEM
Certain procedural aspects of the French court system and process of
adjudication must be taken into account in order to understand the substance of French extradition law. 23 First, the received wisdom is that stare
decisis has no role in the elaboration of law in a civilian jurisdiction. 24 The
notion of jurisprudenceconstante or itablie, however, has emerged in the French
system and, for all intents and purposes, can be viewed as the civilian
analogue of the common law notion of stare decisis. 25
Second, to provide for some consistency in the application of law by the
lower courts, the Courde Cassation(the French Supreme Court) was entrusted
historically with the task of supervising the process of judicial adjudication
in order to maintain uniformity in the application of the laws. 26 This
systemic feature tending toward harmonization of legal doctrine was,
however, specifically excluded by the applicable statute in the case of
extradition requests. The Law of March 10, 1927-which governs matters
of extradition in France-excludes the supervision (cdntr6le) that normally
can be exercised by the Cour de Cassation over the decisions rendered by the
cours d'appel. 27 The various regional courts of appeal in France, therefore,
can articulate and apply a definition of the political offense exception
which will be limited to the cases which come before it.
The French extradition statute also provides that a court ruling which
denies the extradition request is binding upon the government, whereas a
favorable ruling acts only as a judicial recommendation and is not binding
upon the executive branch. 28 As a consequence, the regional cours d'appel
have the potential of thwarting the efforts to bring sanctions to bear
against terrorist offenders by adopting a liberal definition of the concept
of political offense. Moreover, given the tacit laws of French judicial organization, 29 it would seem that the cours d'appel would be more vulnerable
to executive branch pressure to reach a certain result than would the Cour
de Cassation. For this reason, the courts of appeal might be more likely or
willing to act as the "impartial" judicial spokesmen for the political views
of the executive branch and its perceptions of what is in the best interests
of the country.
Although the decision of the competent cour d'appel is not subject to
higher judicial scrutiny, 30 a form of review does take place at a later time,
but it is directed at the executive branch action on the case. In general
terms, France has a bifurcated system of adjudication with two high courts
of appeal and last resort. 31 On the other hand, there is the Cour de Cassation
which is the highest court in private law and criminal law matters; on the
other hand, the Conseil d'Etat acts as the court of last resort in adminstrative
law matters and reviews the legality of government action in matters
involving litigation between private parties and the government. 32
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The significance of the system of court organization in matters of extradition can be illustrated by the following hypothetical example. A hijacks
an airplane in the United States to further the cause of a dissident ethnic
minority group. He kills several passengers in the process, and extorts
several million dollars from the airline company. At the request of A, the
plane is flown to Paris where the hijacker, who is requesting political
asylum, is taken into custody by French police officials. Arguing that
hijacking, murder, and extortion are common crimes despite any political
motivation on the part of the actor, the United States Government makes
a request for the extradition of A pursuant to the relevant extradition
treaty and the principles of public international law.
Under one set of circumstances, assuming that the French Government,
for whatever reason, is opposed to the extradition of A, the Paris Courd 'appel
could deny the extradition request, ruling, under pressure from the executive branch, that the crimes involved were political offenses. Under the
applicable statutory rules, this decision would be binding upon the French
Government 33 and relieve it from any responsibility for making a difficult
diplomatic decision. The French Government would contend that, by law,
its hands are tied by an impartial judicial determination as to what is
criminal and what is political in these circumstances. In such a scenario,
the court of appeals could be seen as acting as the spokesman of national
political views-a position which could undermine the institutional integrity of the judiciary and which would be a questionable view were there
review by the French Supreme Court on doctrinal grounds.
Under another set of circumstances, assuming that the French Government is anxious to extradite A to the United States despite public outcries
in France supporting A's acts, a favorable ruling by the Paris Cour d'appel
on the extradition request would allow the government to make its own
decision in the matter. 34 Here, the final action on the matter is not a
judicial decision which by statute is excluded from further review, 35 but
rather it consists of governmental action which is subject to the scrutiny
of the Conseil d'Etat. In this setting, the problem becomes one of the timeliness of the available remedy. Upon receiving a favorable court ruling, the
executive branch could have A extradited to the United States within
several hours. An action to have the government action reviewed by the
Conseil d'Efat could take weeks, if not longer; a ruling by the Conseild'Etat that
A is a bona fide political offender who should be exempted from extradition would constitute post facto and essentially useless judicial review.
The extradition has become un fait accompli and the question of its legality
no longer is of any moment. The decisions of the regional courts of appeal
and their susceptibility to political pressure are, therefore, critical in the
evaluation of the French doctrine and methodology in this area.
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THE DEFINITION OF THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF AN ACT
The consecrated formulae and equations to deal with the political offense
question can be easily turned upside down and used, in a distorted and
inconsistent form, to translate what is in the best interests of the country
in a given case. In other words, the political offense exception in terrorist
cases may function as an empty shell and be used to articulate a judicial
response to an external political context. The meaning of political offense
may vary according to the existing relationship between the French Government and the requesting state and will translate the perceptions of the
executive branch as to what would be expedient in the given circumstances. Judicial determinations, then, cease to deal with law and to operate
in an effective system of checks and balances.
It could be argued with some persuasiveness that the latter process is
not really offensive or unacceptable; matters of extradition are quintessentially political matters. Whether a State will act as a safe haven for certain
types of fugitives is a determination to be made by the existing political
administration which usually is subject to the effective protests of the
public. How the balance between the repression of crime and the expression of political convictions is to be established is a matter for determination by political organs who bear diplomatic and domestic responsibility
for this determination.
Although the French extradition statute attributes a rather formalistic
role to the courts in deciding upon extradition requests, it also gives them
a substantive part to play. 36 Presumably, that statutory mission was to be
carried out with the usual judicial impartiality. The French Cours d'appelnot
only must ascertain whether an extradition request conforms to statutory
requirements and procedural technicalities, but also these courts are entrusted with a determination on the political offense question (which, if
found to apply, excludes any further action on the part of the executive
branch). 37 The participation of the courts in this process, then, is not
exclusively procedural and can have some very significant bearing upon
the substance of the case.
The drafters of the extradition statute, it seems, were concerned with
taking the decision on an extradition request in which the political offense
exception was invoked from the exclusive purview of political considerations. 38 The courts were to act as a source of neutral authority, guaranteeing that expressions of political conviction would not be subject in this
setting to the calculated whim and caprice of national political expediency.
Yet, in reading some of the relevant French cases, one wonders whether
the political offense doctrine is to be taken seriously as a limitation on the
outcome of the case or whether the results are foregone, arbitrary conclu-
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sions which are arrived at by a stealthy manipulation of doctrine for
reasons external to the legal dimensions of the case. 39

THE INITIAL ORIENTATION: "HOLDER" AND "ABU DAOUD"
The first set of cases, ranging from the 1975 Holder opinion 40 and the Abu
Daoud decision 41 in 1977 to the Pace 42 and Piperno43 cases in 1979 present
fact patterns falling into a classic mold: an international terrorist is apprehended in the French territory (usually Paris) and is taken into custody
on the basis of international arrest warrants. 44 The alleged terrorist
offender is then held pending extradition requests from interested States.
For these fugitives, France received extradition requests primarily from
Germany and Italy, with a single request coming from Israel and the
United States. The conformity of these cases with one another ceases with
the basic similarity in their general circumstances; each attests to a shift
and evolution in the application of the political offense exception by the
French courts.
The Holder decision, 45 rendered in 1975, perhaps best illustrates one
extreme in the French courts' interpretation of the concept of political
offense in the context of terrorism. There, Holder and an accomplice had
hijacked an airplane in the United States and eventually commanded that
it be flown to Paris, extorting in the meantime $500,000 from the airline
company and making some vague allusions to prominent American radicals. 46 Apparently following the French Government's criticism of U.S.
policy in Vietnam, the Cour d'appel of Paris held that the acts involved
(airplane hijacking and extortion) were political offenses, and denied the
extradition request on that basis. 47 Had the reasoning and doctrine articulated in Holder been meant to be taken seriously for its precedentsetting value, it would have been a very unfortunate ruling for the efforts
aimed at curtailing terrorist activities.
Indeed, there was precious little in the Holder record to indicate political
motivation for the hijacking, and-even if there had been more evidencethe gravity of the offenses for which extradition was requested should
have outweighed the political character of the act. In this case, the French
court chose to adopt a lax definition of the concept of political offense
apparently for extra-judicial reasons. The court arrogated to itself an executive role, reaching a decision which voiced or supported national political views. In terms of doctrine and the elaboration of norms, the Holder
determination, however, was essentially unsupported by the record. Under
the Holder reasoning, it seems that any reference to political convictions (no
matter how oblique) in the commission of a crime could suffice to prevent
the extradition of an alleged offender. In articulating its ruling, the court
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did not appear to be constrained by any doctrinal or systemic imperatives:
it arrogated to itself the prerogative of declaring any and all criminal acts
to be political in character.
Although no explicit mention of the political offense exception was
made in the Abu Daoud case, this decision 48 confirmed the view that the
Cour d'appel of Paris was extraordinarily sensitive to the external political
circumstances which surrounded a request for the extradition of an alleged
terrorist offender. There, the would-be Arab organizer of the Munich
Olympics Massacre was arrested in Paris and requests for his extradition
were made by the West German and Israeli Governments. 49 Due to the
potentially explosive political circumstances which attended the case, the
proceeding took place in haste and the ruling denying the extradition
requests was based upon an extremely technical procedural reasoning 50
(which essentially reflected a breakdown of communications between the
French and West German Governments). 51 Despite his apprehension by
law enforcement officials, the would-be organizer of an international mass
murder incident was not brought to justice because of the possible political
consequences which might accompany a decision to grant extradition (the
threat of an oil embargo or possible terrorist reprisals). 52 Again, the court
seemed to be influenced by political considerations and willing to fabricate
a judicial determination which would accommodate non-legal exigencies.
These first decisions portended badly for the future orientation of the
French jurisprudence in this area of litigation. Previously, the French
courts had espoused an extremely restrictive view of the political offense
exception, limiting it to what were termed objective political acts such as
treason. 53 By the mid-1970s, it was clear that the French courts had
reconsidered their former position on this issue and fashioned their own
version of the Swiss predominance test (essentially, an ad hoc approach
under which a variety of factors are weighed to arrive at an assessment of
an act's predominant character-political or criminal). 54 In doing so, however, the French courts seemed to have gone from one extreme to another;
their version of the predominance test appeared to allow them to consider
both juridical and extra-juridical variables. As applied by the Cour d'appel
of Paris, the French definition of political offense could result in a whimsical and capricious determination, unguided by accepted views in the area
(as in Holder), or in an unjustifiably broad consideration of all the external
political factors which might surround a given case (as in Abu Daoud). The
court usurped the executive branch function or at least acquiesced to
executive dictates.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STANDARD:
"CROISSANT" ET AL.
Another series of cases demonstrated a shift in the French jurisprudence
dealing with the application of the political offense exception in litigation
involving the extradition of terrorists. These cases, it seems, were less
politically charged, involving extradition requests that were less sensitive
diplomatically and in terms of the French perception of the realpolitik. Also,
the administration of former President Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing was in the
process of articulating a new French policy on international crime, known
as l'espacejudiciaireeuropien (the European Judicial Area), which attempted to
promote EEC cooperation in the apprehension of criminal fugitives-specifically terrorists. 55 This idea, born of the French President's desire to
establish a secure and independent European Community and to assure
French leadership in its creation and maintenance, was a logical sequel to
the text of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. The
corpus of cases in this new stage of the French decisional law began with
the Croissantdecision, 56 included the extradition of other West Germans, 57
and ended with the Piperno 58 and Pace 59 cases.
In the Klaus Croissantcase, the West German attorney for members of the
Baader-Meinhof gang fled to France after being arrested in West Germany;
apparently, his aim in coming to France was to seek political asylum. 60
Once he was taken into custody by French police authorities, the West
German Government made a request for his extradition on charges relating
to his complicity with the terrorist group. German authorities alleged that
Croissant had acted as an information conduit between imprisoned terrorists and those who were still at liberty, and that he had "propagandized"
on behalf of the terrorist group. 61 The case generated outcrys and protests
-especially from members of the French bar. Lawyers, legal academicians,
and journalists perceived the action as an infringement of the attorneyclient privilege, an unwarranted restriction of the freedom of political
speech, a fascist reaction to the security problem posed by terrorism, and
an undermining of France's long-cherished status as a haven for political
asylum and reputation for the promotion of the "rights of man" (les droits
de l'homme). 62
Although some of the charges for which extradition was sought clearly
smacked of the political (at least much more so than in Holder), the court
very quietly and astutely avoided a consideration of this factor and a larger
doctrinal pronouncement on the issue of the political offense exception. 63 The court rendered a "partially favorable" opinion, relying on the
principle of speciality and limiting the extradition to the charges which
were so serious in terms of their criminality so as to preclude a consideration of their political character. 64 The new formulation was that the
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"gravity" of the offenses (their "odious" criminal character) precluded a
consideration of their political motivation. This doctrine was to faire jurisprudence, to become the basis for many subsequent decisions of the Cour
d'appel of Paris in this area.

THE CONSEIL D'ETAT AND CROISSANT
To the continued protests of members of the French bar and the opposition
political parties, Croissant was extradited immediately to West Germany. 65 Thereafter, Croissant's attorneys lodged an appeal before the
Conseil d'Etat, alleging that the government's action was illegal and claiming
that Croissant was a political offender who should have been exempted
from extradition. 66 Although it appears that such post facto review would
be of little consequence to Croissant, a declaration of illegality might have
been taken into account by the West German political and judicial authorities. Moreover, such a ruling from the highest administrative court in
France might be enough to fuel the fires of the opposition and result in a
severe public discrediting of the government's action. Finally, a holding
that Croissant was a political offender might have a sufficient impact to get
the Cour d'appel of Paris and its regional analogues to reconsider the precedent set by the initial Croissant ruling.
Whatever the motivation for the subsequent appeal, it was significant
in itself that the Conseil d'Etat decided to hear the case. 67 Under previously
applicable procedure, the Cour d'appelwas, as it were, the court of last resort
in extradition; it was empowered by statute to determine whether the
extradition request satisfied the relevant legal requirements and its decision, once rendered, had res judicata effect. 68 To characterize the opinion in
proper French procedural terms, it was neither an arrit nor a dicision (both
subject to appeal), but merely an avis motivi (a simple reasoned opinion not
susceptible of appeal). 69 In an attempt to integrate some measure of review
into this process, some writers had argued that the Cour d'appel was not in
this context simply a court with private law jurisdiction. Rather, it was
really engaging in an administrative proceeding when reviewing requests
for extradition. 70 This characterization would allow an appeal through
administrative court review, but without answering the vexed question of
how extensive this administrative review should be in actual practice.
Their theoretical cohesiveness notwithstanding, these recommendations
were never formally adopted. 71
Beginning in 1937, the Conseil d'Etat began asserting and progressively
expanding its own jurisdiction in these matters. 72 It first held that it had
jurisdiction to review the regularity of an extradition decree for the violation of a domestic procedural law norm; then, it held that its jurisdictional
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mandate also allowed it to assess the regularity of an extradition decree for
the violation of an international convention. 73 Both of these rulings gave
the Conseil d'Etatpower to scrutinize extradition decrees that were issued by
the French Government for infringement of basic principles of domestic
and international law, a sort of public policy scrutiny.
Finally, in 1977, the Conseil d'Etat held that it had the authority to review
the regularity of an extradition decree by ascertaining whether the reasons
(motifs) given by the Cour d'appel for granting or refusing the extradition
request corresponded to those contained in the applicable international
convention. 74 This ruling allowed the Conseil d'Etatto consider whether the
acts for which extradition was requested were political or criminal in
character under the applicable law. Although the Cour de Cassation(here, the
ordinary channel of appeal) did not have the power to review the Cour
d'appel's decision, the Conseil d'Etat would be able to engage in a substantive
review of the appellate court decision 75 because the Government would
act upon the basis of the court's reasoned opinion. While in most cases
such review would come too late to have any practical impact for the
individual extraditee (presumably, the government would have already
acted), it provided for the possibility not only of embarrassing the government, but also of attributing some degree of uniformity to the French
jurisprudence on the political offense exception question. Higher court
review on doctrinal and other grounds had been excluded specifically by
statute, but now was integrated into the extradition framework through
the ingenious interpretations of the Conseil d'Etat.
The procedural significance of Croissant (and subsequently Salati) 76 lies
in the fact that it confirmed the principle that administrative court review
of an extradition decree was possible on the ground that there had been
an abuse of power. 77 The Cour d'appel's reasoned opinion in these matters
was considered as the exercise of an administrative function and jurisdiction by a private law court. 78 Moreover, in terms of substance, the Conseil
d'Etat 's decision in Croissant did provide for a degree of uniformity that had
not been known in this area of litigation. 79 The highest administrative
court in France confirmed the view of the Cour d'appel that the common law
criminal accusations against the would-be offender were too grave to be
considered as political offenses. As a result, this became the consecrated
doctrinal formulae in subsequent cases considered by the Cour d'appel of
Paris.

AN EVALUATION OF THE EMERGING DOCTRINE
Although far from being entirely satisfactory, this doctrinal framework at
least had the advantage of imposing certain principled constraints upon the
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courts. The reigning French judicial position, as affirmed by the highest
French administrative court, was that legal sanctions needed to be imposed
against fugitive terrorist offenders by creating a type of presumption that
held their activities to be exclusively criminal in character because of their
gravity.
Some might argue that the courts were no more independent or neutral
in deploying this doctrine than they had been in the Holder or Abu Daoud
cases. This newly-found French judicial posture simply reflected the position of the Giscard d'Estaing administration in regard to international
criminality and its efforts to spearhead the creation of a European Judicial
Area. While such criticism may be valid-perhaps indicating no more than
a basic consensus of opinion between the executive and judicial branches
on the subject of terrorism, the rulings were not rendered in ex cathedra
fashion nor did they turn exclusively upon procedural technicalities. Rather, they represented a principled and consistent doctrinal approach which
grappled persuasively with a difficult issue. Although there may have been
agreement between the executive and the judiciary, there was no explicit
subordination, submissiveness, or interference; the judicial determination
was separable from the political action in terms of form and substance.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CRIMES DISTINGUISHED
This line of jurisprudence also gave rise to another, equally felicitious
distinction-which acted in effect as a corollary to the gravity of the acts
principle. The distinction centered upon the difference between social
crimes and political offenses, and can best be illustrated by the reasoning
in the Winter extradition. 80 There, the West German Government sought
the extradition from France of one Winter who allegedly had helped to
establish a terrorist group among those awaiting trial in Nuremberg. 81
According to the group's propaganda, its aim was to make the inmates
revolt "in order to achieve the abolition of existing social conditions and
to oppose the State according to the example of the 'Red Army Faction'
with the means of urban warfare, to promote revolution, and eliminate
through violence the established order in the Federal Republic of Germany." 82
In ruling favorably upon the extradition request, the Cour d'appel of Paris
differentiated between crimes committed with a predominantly political
motivation and acts which advocated complete social destruction, removing anarchistic crimes-as the nineteenth century courts had done-from
the purview of the political offense exception. 83 The court excluded Winter's activities from the political offense exception by characterizing the
purpose of the movement in which he had participated and instigated

EXTRADITION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

221

as not being able to be attributed a political character once the movement in
question did not have as its objective attacking the political structure of the
State but those of the German Nation as a socially organized group.
...The social crime, born at the end of the nineteenth century, is distinguished, in criminal law, from the political offense and is considered both by
the decisional law and by doctrinal writers, as a common law crime. 84

AN EXAMPLE OF THE NEW METHODOLOGY
In conjunction with the reasoning in Croissant, this new doctrine was applied in a subsequent case involving twin extradition requests for two
West German nationals. 85 The potential extraditees, Ingrid Barabass and
Sieglinde Hofmann, were apprehended in Paris during the early summer
of 1980 and requests were made by the West German Government for their
extradition. 86 The international arrest warrants alleged that Barabass was
involved in the kidnapping of the industrialist Walter Palmers and Hofmann in the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Juggen Ponto. 87
In ruling favorably upon the extradition requests, the Cour d'appelof Paris
combined the Croissantand Winter doctrinal methodologies, holding implicitly in both cases that the acts for which extradition was sought were social
crimes and not political offenses because of their gravity:
[t]he fact that these acts, would have had as [their] objective.., to upset and
transform by violence, the established order in the Federal German Republic,
does not suffice, in light of their gravity, to have them seen as having a
political character....
Moreover, it is significant, in this regard, to note that the requesting authorities, defined the objective of the group[s] in question, as being the destruction of a fundamental order, without further qualification .... 88

POSSIBLE MOTIVATION FOR THE EMERGING DOCTRINE
In the litigation dealing with the extradition of terrorists who were West
German nationals, the Courd'appel of Paris systematically rendered opinions
favoring the extradition of the fugitives. While failing to articulate fully
and explicitly a definition of a political offense in this context, the court
at least removed the terrorist acts in question from the purview of the
political offense exception and elaborated two negative criteria relating to
political crimes. These criteria refined the concept of political offense by
excluding terrorist acts which were of a particularly serious criminal character (kidnapping or killing to advance a political cause) and by excluding
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anarchistic crimes aimed at eradicating the social structure of an existing
society rather than uprooting the current political regime.
According to this jurisprudence, two presumptions of nonapplicability
of the political offense exception were at work in cases involving the
extradition of a would-be West German terrorist: first, terrorist acts were
of a "profound [criminal] gravity" and, second, they constituted crimes
which endeavored to create total social-and not merely politicalupheaval. In the words of the Croissant court, "these acts are essentially
cold-blooded crimes which arose from a sort of political motivation, [but]
this factor without more is not enough to create an obstacle to extradition.
..,"89 The elaboration of such a doctrine was a welcome change from the
porous and whimsical approach deployed in Holder and Abu Daoud-not
only because of the result, but more importantly because of the articulation of a cogent doctrine for use in international litigation. What factors,
however, explain the shift in the court's attitude and approach? Had the
Cour d'appel of Paris suddenly become considerably less aware of the political ramifications of these cases and more concerned with the need for
judicial integrity and predictable juridical norms?
One could argue that the previous decisions were freakish resultsaberrations rendered at a weak point in the court's tenure when it was
under intense political pressure. Possibly, the Conseil d'Etat's decision in
Croissant had a sufficient impact. It is difficult, however, to excise these
decisions and the emerging doctrine from the external political circumstances that surrounded them and the ebb and flow of French international
policy. Holder had been decided at a time when Franco-American relations
were in a difficult phase; the administration of Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing
had been unabashed in its criticism of the U.S. policy in Vietnam to the
point that pro-government French newspapers regularly accused the United States of imperialism. Moreover, a few months before, the United States
had indicated which candidate it prefered in the upcoming 1974 French
presidential elections-a faux pas which the French considered an unwarranted and inexcusable interference in their internal affairs. The Abu Daoud
decision was not merely an exchange of injurious insults between national
governments. The case also presented France with an explosive political,
economic, and diplomatic situation especially when the West German
enthusiasm for extradition waned into unexplained reticence and silence.
In contrast, none of the West German extradition cases were engulfed
by such circumstances; cooperation in these instances was actually politically desirable. In addition to the Giscard d'Estaing administration's efforts
to promote international judicial cooperation through the creation of the
European Judicial Area, Franco-German relations were extremely good and
cemented by the personal friendship of the two national leaders. More-
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over, the cases involved the extradition of West German nationals for acts
committed in West Germany.
Although the Croissant case generated some domestic turmoil and involved a debate about possible limitations on a fundamental right, the acts
for which extradition was requested involved conduct the criminal nature
of which was evident. Since the decisions presented no real political difficulty, the court was free to elaborate a doctrine which met at least minimal
standards of acceptable judicial reasoning. If there were any political pressure, it would be to reach a result which favored extradition and minimized
the scope of the political offense exception. Whether the established doctrine was molded in complete judicial neutrality is an unanswerable question, but the Conseil d 'Fat 's ruling in Croissantindicates that the doctrine was
the product of judicial consensus, rather than any direct executive-judicial
branch complicity. It does remain, however, that the doctrine was one
which conformed to the French Government's realpolitik; its status, therefore, remained fragile.
THE RESURFACING OF THE PRIOR
METHODOLOGY: "MacCANN"
The fragility of judicial doctrine in the face of the self-interest of national
political policy is forcefully illustrated by the contrast between the foregoing West German cases and the MacCann litigation which also involved an
extradition request from the West German Government. In MacCann, 90 the
accused, an Irish national who was suspected of belonging to the IRA,
entered West Germany and placed two bombs in the English sector of a
German city. The record indicated, however, that the bombs had been
placed in an area which was open to the general public. 91 On the basis of
this information, the Cour d'appelof Paris held that the acts in question had
a political character, denying the extradition request on this basis. To
provide some justification for its conclusion, the court's short opinion
noted that the explosion of the bombs had not resulted in any fatalities
and had damaged only physical property. 92
Although there is an earlier French case 93 which bears some, albeit
tenuous, resemblance to the result and reasoning in MacCann, it seems that
the latter is totally inconsistent with the other decisions concerning West
German extradition requests that have been discussed. The act of placing
a bomb in a public place can easily be considered as grave as acting as an
information link between terrorists or kidnapping prominent business
leaders. Moreover, it could plausibly be argued that such conduct aiming
at wanton destruction may be a type of anarchistic social crime rather than
a political offense. Despite the strength of his purported political motiva-
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tion, MacCann never had the presence of mind to place the bombs near
a British institution in West Germany. The possibility that MacCann was
a demented lunatic babbling political slogans was perhaps more likely an
explanation of his conduct than his being a political offender. Yet, the
court's superficial and conclusory reasoning did not consider this possibility.
MacCann falls into line with the cluster of cases represented by Holder and
Abu Daoud. Unlike the other West German cases, the potential extraditee
was not a West German national, and it was clear that he was a member
of the IRA. Either because of executive branch influence or because of the
judicial perception of the French national interest, the court must have
considered the possibility of IRA reprisals in France in reaching its determination. As in the Holder and Abu Daoud cases, however, that pre-eminently political consideration should have been taken into account by the
executive branch and not the court.
For purposes of underscoring the point, it should be reiterated that in
extradition matters, the court of appeal acts basically in an advisory capacity, ascertaining whether the extradition request satisfies the procedural
requirements established by the domestic statute or the applicable international convention. 94 It plays a greater substantive role when it considers
the political offense question, but it should be reiterated that a positive
ruling is not binding upon the executive. 95 In other words, a favorable or
partially favorable opinion on an extradition request means only that the
latter satisfies existing legal norms and the executive branch can do whatever it thinks fit according to its perception of political considerations.
Extradition remains a matter of sovereign State discretion. It is only when
the court renders a negative opinion that it prevents the political arm of
the government from acting on its own will. 96
Do the opinions in Holder, Abu Daoud, and now MacCann reflect what the
Cour d'appel of Paris thinks in these matters as a neutral judicial body
applying the consecrated legal norms in this area of litigation? In all of
these cases, the opinions have been rushed and flimsy-there is a notable
absence of doctrinal reasoning in all of them and a manifest disregard of
certain evident considerations. The court's dogmatic opinions voice foregone political conclusions. It is one thing to articulate a rational legal
doctrine to deal with a given issue-a doctrine which happens to coincide
with national political views on that issue, but it is quite another thing to
have the courts not only confirm but also advance political decisions based
on non-existent doctrine. It seems that the independence of the courts and
the elaboration of carefully considered juridical norms are a reality only
when the dictates of national political feasibility allow for it.
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EXTRADITION DOCTRINE THOUGH THE
PRISM OF THE ITALIAN CASES
Another set of cases, this time dealing with the extradition of Italian
terrorists, attests to the fact that the two-prong doctrinal methodology
elaborated in the West German cases continues to have some vitality in
French extradition litigation. This new set of cases involved the extradition
of Italian nationals-Piperno and Pace-who allegedly were members of
the Red Brigades and had been involved in the kidnapping and murder of
Aldo Moro. 97 In granting these extradition requests, the Cour d'appel of
Paris addressed only one of the issues of the two-prong analysis and found
it to be dispositive of the political offense question. 98
Unlike an earlier case involving the extradition of a Red Brigades terrorist 99 and some of the West German cases, 100 the court did not focus
directly upon the question of whether the Red Brigade activities constituted political conduct. In previous cases, the court had ruled-much as in the
West German litigation-that "the armed band called the Red Brigades
[was] created to topple through violence the economic and social order of
the Italian State," 101 implying quite clearly that their activities amounted
to social as opposed to political crimes. In Piperno and Pace, the court of
appeal did not address the issue of whether the activities of the Red
Brigade group were political or social crimes (for example, the court never
stated that these activities were devoid of political character). Instead, the
court held that the gravity of the acts for which extradition was sought
precluded any further consideration of the possible political motivation of
the acts. 102 If the potential extraditee allegedly had engaged in serious
criminal activity, his acts (for purposes of extradition) remained common
law offenses no matter what their political motivation. This reasoning
appears to be very similar in its rationale to the nineteenth century doctrine
termed the "attentatclause," which exempted political assassinations from
the purview of the political offense exception. 103

AFFATIGATO
A number of more recent French extradition cases, all decided in 1980,
confirm the continued relevance of the two-pronged approach. The Cour
d'appel of Paris, for example, rendered a partially favorable opinion concerning the extradition of Pinna and Bianco. These two Italian nationals
were part of a left-wing Italian terrorist group. Accordingly, the court
allowed the extradition, but limited it to classic common law crimes (e.g.,
armed robbery and drug dealing). 104 In the leading case of Marco Affatigato, 105 the Courd'appel of Aix-en-Provence adopted a methodology similar
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to that deployed by its counterpart in Paris, illustrating that the two-prong
doctrinal approach also has some currency among the French regional
courts of appeal.
In Affatigato, the accused was a right-wing Italian militant who had been
arrested in southern France; the Italian Government requested his extradition on a number of grounds, including hiding and giving refuge to fugitive
criminals and engaging in the reconstitution of the facist party in Italy. 106
In regard to the first charge, Affatigato had been found guilty of giving
refuge to Mario Tutti who had killed two police officials; as a result,
Affatigato had been sentenced to three years and six months in prison. 107
The Cour d'appel of Aix-en-Provence ruled that
[t]he subsequent hiding of which Affatigato is accused is that of an individual having committed the most serious crimes according to morality and the
common law, crimes which created a collective danger and were committed
in a context of violence, by having recourse to means which were those of
a base criminality; that, in light of the existing connexity, the gravity of the
acts is such that consideration must end with their objective character, without admitting the political character that Affatigato wants to have attributed
to them. 108
Here as elsewhere, the dispositive criterion was the gravity, the serious
criminal character of the acts which precluded a consideration of their
alleged (and more subjective) political character.
In regard to the second charge (reconstituting the fascist party), the
court held, despite the unmistakable political connotations of the accusation, that article 17 of the Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947 with Italy
created a "special juridical situation." 109 According to the provision of the
Peace Treaty, Italy assumed the responsibility of "not tolerating the reconstitution of fascist organizations on its territory" which the Cour d'appel
construed as creating a mandatory "public international law norm" for
Italy. 110 The ground for extradition,.in the court's view, "did not constitute a spontaneous initiative on the part of the requesting State." 111 The
charge was not related to internal measures of political repression which
the Italian State had initiated, but rather was the expression of the violation of an international norm by an individual.
Affatigato already had been tried for a charge of reconstituting the
fascist party in Italy and had several years of a prison term to serve. 112
Deeming that international treaty obligations superseded any inconsistent
provisions of internal law and that the offense was punishable in France
by imprisonment, the French court gave "a favorable opinion to extraditing Affatigato to satisfy the remainder ... [of his prison term] for the
charge of reconstituting the fascist party .... -l
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The Affatigato opinion has a two-fold significance. First, it confirms the
doctrinal methodology articulated in the jurisprudence of the Cour d'appel
of Paris by adopting the gravity rationale (and adding the notion of "base
criminality") to exempt terrorist acts from the purview of the political
offense exception. A principled and seemingly unbiased application of
juridical norms, therefore, holds sway among the various cours d'appel. Second, perhaps more importantly, the decision of the Cour d'appel of Aix-enProvence permits the extradition to take place on the additional ground of
what appears (on its face at least) to be a manifestly political offense. The
French court, however, seems to have engaged in a studied and subtle piece
of judicial reasoning which implicitly sheds light on the French judicial
conception of the notion of political offense. The crime in question did not
arise from a violation of any provision of domestic Italian law per se, but
rather of an international obligation imposed on the Italian State as a result
of its wartime conduct. From the perspective of political history, the obligation was deemed essential to European security and, as a matter of policy
as determined by European political leaders, was deemed to pre-empt the
value placed on the freedom of political expression and activity.
One commentator 114 concluded that the Affatigato opinion disregarded
the letter of the 1927 French Extradition Statute by using the gravity
rationale and extending the scope of extradition to include purely political
crimes. 115 These observations indicate a complete misunderstanding of
the extradition law and of the limied nature of the court's holding in
regard to the political charge. Like most extradition laws, the French Extradition Statute does provide for the application of the political offense
exception; 116 once this is acknowledged, the critical problem becomes one
of defining what is meant by a political offense. The statute provides little
guidance on that problem, and-since the nineteenth century-the definition has been a matter of judicial construction. 117 The view that terrorist
acts, despite their possible political motivation, are simply too heinous a
form of criminality to merit a consideration of their contorted political
motives does no disservice either to the letter or spirit of the 1927 statute.
Rather, it adds needed substance to the statutory language in a principled
fashion with a doctrinal reasoning that has historical antecedents and
contemporary echoes in the decisional law of other jurisdictions.
To claim that the court established the principle that extradition would
be granted for purely political crimes is an outrageous misreading of the
opinion. The court unequivocally pointed out that this situation was exceptional and limited; it articulated a determination which accommodated
that situation logically and convincingly without posing the possibility of
French judicial acquiescence to and cooperation in political repression.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ITALIAN LITIGATION
As with the West German cases, one could argue that the emergence and
continued vitality of the doctrine in the Italian litigation was possible only
because of auspicious external political circumstances. Fearing political
repression and the demise of France's reputation as a haven for political
refugees, 118 left-wing journalists emphasized the dangers of cooperation
among European nations in criminal matters. Yet, the self-interest of the
French and Italian States dictated that legal sanctions be brought to bear
against these fugitives. In addition to preserving the amicable tenor of
Franco-Italian relations, the positive rulings of the French courts lent credence to the French initiative to create a European Judicial Area in criminal
matters and advanced a strong French position against terrorism (with only
a minimal threat of reprisals). Once again, the courts were allowed to
function normally, as it were, because it was a politically tenable position
to allow them to do so.
The various cases have given rise to an emerging doctrinal position
apparently unperturbed by considerations of political expediency. This
position can be summarized in the following terms: as a general rule, the
French courts view terrorist acts as criminal acts. Despite the purported
political motivation which underlies their behavior, terrorist offenders will
be extradited from France if their acts reflect criminal conduct of a serious
nature. Even when the act is not such a serious offense, extradition may
take place if the acts in question are characterized as social crimes-aimed
at toppling the existing social order and not merely the existing political
regime.

THE SPANISH CASES
The final group of cases involves the extradition of Spanish Basque militants. These cases confirm the view-advanced in the analysis of the Holder
and Abu Daoudcases-that the French courts at times will act as the indirect
spokesmen for French national political policy, at the expense of articulating and applying consistent juridical norms. On the one hand, there are a
considerable number of Basques in southern France and a pro-Spanish
Government posture adopted either by the French courts or Government
in these extradition matters could entail domestic turmoil of not insignificant proportions. On the other hand, France traditionally has been attached to its reputation as a haven for political refugees. It has advocated
the rights of man with respect to political freedoms, and historically has
been critical of the Franco regime in Spain. Despite the liberalization of the
Spanish regime with the advent of King Juan Carlos, the Basque issue

EXTRADITION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

229

remains a sensitive and delicate issue in Franco-Spanish relations. The
election of a socialist regime in France could only exacerbate the already
existing tensions. The jurisprudence (primarily of courts of appeal in
southern France) has not neglected the political climate which surrounds
the Basque issue and, in fact, at times has taken it into account to the
detriment of doctrine.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE CONSEIL D'ETAT
IN "ASTUDILLO-CALLEJA"
A 1977 decision of the Conseil d'Etat indicates the tenor of some of the
French court opinions dealing with the extradition of politically militant
Spanish nationals. In Astudillo-Calleja, 119 the Spanish Government requested the extradition of the accused on bank robbery and other theft charges.
The accused, however, had a long history of opposition to the Spanish
regime; he had received prison sentences, inter alia, for refusing to be inducted in the army and for propagandizing against the government and the
army. 120 The Spanish Government maintained that the acts of the accused, in objective terms, did not have a political character and were
devoid of political motive. 121
The Cour d'appel ruled that the acts for which extradition was requested
were common law crimes; the Conseil d'Etat reversed that decision, holding
that-in light of the accused's past opposition to the Spanish political
regime-the extradition request had been made with a political end (another ground in the French extradition statute upon which to refuse extradition for political reasons). 122 The extradition request had been made at
the time when Franco held power in Spain and the court evidently was
concerned with granting the accused the right of asylum despite his criminal activity. No mention was made of the gravity of the offenses or whether they could be deemed to be social as opposed to political crimes. 123

OTHER CASES: GROPING FOR CONSISTENCY
The appellate court determinations in the Spanish litigation have not been
fully consistent, but there does appear to be a predisposition on the part
of the French courts to view Spanish terrorists as political militants deserving of refuge regardless of the extent of their criminal conduct.
The Cour d'appel of Paris has exhibited a hesitant attitude in these matters. For example, in the Manuel Viusa-Camps case, 124 the Paris court avoided
any consideration of the political offense question or of the gravity of the
crimes for which extradition was sought (which included the charge of
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collaborating with armed bands). 125 The record did not depict ViusaCamps as a political militant belonging to an organized group, although the
arrest warrant seemed to link him to Basque separatist organizations. 126
Rather than address the political issue head on, the Paris court focused
upon the issue of whether the charges were punishable both in France and
Spain (a requirement of the Franco-Spanish Extradition Convention).
Adopting a rather involved and somewhat specious discussion of the definition of the term "armed bands," the court concluded that the offenses
were not punishable in France and, therefore, not extraditable offenses
under the applicable convention. 127 This sort of intricate and arguably
incorrect technical reasoning was not the approach characteristic of the
West German cases, although it did surface in the Abu Daoud opinion. 128
The Cour d'appel of Paris cleverly side-tracked while rendering a "politically
appropriate" decision.
The provincial appellate courts located in the south of France have
shown considerably less reticence in such litigation, perhaps because these
courts have a greater affinity to the problem that is raised, have a more
sympathetic view of its political ramifications, and-being located in a
geographically more volatile area-may sense greater pressure to reach
politically viable determinations. The Elorriaga129 and Azcargorta 130 decisions attest to this difference in attitude. There, the accused were wanted
for a number of serious charges, including, the murder of policemen, armed
robbery, and possession of arms. 131 The Cour d'appel of Aix-en-Provence,
however, rendered an unfavorable decision in regard to their extradition
by holding that the charges had a political character. 132 Both men were
political militants and members of a group known as the ETA. 133 The
court reasoned that "it followed from all the elements of the case, that all
of the charges alleged, no matter how serious they were, were perpetrated in the
context of the struggle led by a part of the population of the Basque
provinces of Spain aiming to obtain political autonomy." 134
Exactly the opposite reasoning had been applied in the West German
and Italian cases to give judicial support to the extradition of the alleged
offenders. The acts of which the Spanish nationals were accused were no
less heinous or odious than those of the West German nationals. The
applicable statutory and treaty law was the same, allowing the gravity of
certain crimes to preclude a consideration of their possible political motivation and character. The doctrinal principle which seems to emerge from
the Spanish Basque cases, however, is unfavorable to extradition and the
repression of international criminal activity: no matter how serious the
criminal character of the acts, Spanish Basque militants will not be extradited because their activities have a sufficient political motivation. The
only explanation for the contradistinction between the judicial doctrine
deployed in the West German and Italian cases and the analytical frame-
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work that applies in the Spanish cases resides in the continuing French
sympathy for Spanish militants. 135
The Conseil d'Etat'sdecision in Astudillo-Calleja indicated that the Spanish
cases were singled out for special treatment-an approach which reflects
the national self-interest in not provoking tension between the French
Government and the Basque population in southern France. Moreover,
France has long been an opponent of the Franco policies in Spain, anddespite the change in the Spanish regime-continues to have serious
doubts about the admission of Spain to the EEC. In addition, France wants
to maintain its reputation for affording political asylum to political dissenters from other countries. It is, however, difficult to reconcile the latter
aspiration with France's commitment to and leadership in the repression
of international criminal activity; in terms of logic and consistency, France
cannot be une terre d'asile for some criminal-political offenders and not for
others depending upon the nationality of the offenders and the self-interest of French national policy. Finally, although it is not possible at the
present time to confirm speculation about contemporary developments,
the entire complexion of extradition litigation-at least from the executive
branch perspective-may be altered considerably by the socialist ideology
of the Mitterand administration.
Recent cases involving the extradition of Spanish nationals have generated mixed results. For example, on July 8, 1981, the Cour d'appel of Pau
precluded the extradition of six Spanish Basques who were wanted in
Spain for crimes which included armed robbery and the possession of
explosives. 136 Five of the six fugitives, however, were held for charges in
France, 137 a factor which may indicate that the French policy in this area
might be evolving toward a makeshift (perhaps token) prosecute-or-extradite position. The Pau court did give favorable rulings in three other cases
in which the fugitives were wanted for murder-notwithstanding the
possible political coloration that could be attributed to these acts. 138
Despite its geographical isolation from the French Basque population,
the Cour d'appel of Paris rendered what could be considered an exemplary
decision in a recent Spanish Basque case. There, one Linaza, a Spanish
Basque militant and member of the ETA, was arrested on March 23, 1981,
at the Charles-de-Gaulle airport near Paris. 139 The Spanish Government
requested his extradition for crimes which included the assassination of a
local Spanish government official, an attempted attack upon a Spanish
nuclear plant, and the ambush of a Spanish military convoy in which six
soldiers were killed. 140 In rendering an opinion favorable to the extradition, the Paris court followed the doctrine it had elaborated in Croissant
-- deeming the acts to be of such an odious character as to preclude consideration of their motivation or of the context in which they were commit-

ted. 141
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The decision created an important diplomatic problem, aggravating already tense Franco-Spanish relations. 142 The French "Socialist" Administration eventually decided not to extradite Linaza, stating that its decision
did not reflect an unbending policy position in these matters, but rather
indicated that extradition would be decided on a case-by-case basis. 143
The significance of Linaza lies in the fact that the Paris court reached a
determination that apparently was independent of external political factors and exemplified the neutral application of existing juridical norms.
One may speculate that this newly-found independence might be related
to the socialists' recent rise to power in France. Such an interpretation is
extremely conjectural, however. The Linaza opinion probably represented
the disinterested application of legal norms by the court. 144

CONCLUSION
The corpus of cases that has been analyzed reflects a hesitant and sometimes perplexing evolution of the French judicial application of the political offense exception in contemporary litigation involving the extradition
of terrorist offenders. The elaboration of juridical norms never is an easy
task; the difficulties become nearly insurmountable when the task includes
devising a definition of the term political offense which segregates it persuasively from a purely criminal act in the context of terrorist activities.
In addition, two equally fundamental policies are in direct competition in
this analysis: the value attributed to the freedom of political expression
and dissent by Western democratic societies and the necessity of curbing
international criminal activity.
These problems are exacerbated by external political factors which
could turn extradition into a vehicle for the pursuit of national self-interest. It is easier for the national government to couch a difficult or embarrassing political decision in the garb of judicial neutrality and
objectivity-be it to establish a European policy on cooperation in criminal
matters, to criticize implicitly Spanish political policies, or to deter Arab
oil blackmail and terrorist reprisals. The need to reach a politically expedient determination can be communicated to the court, especially when the
judges are civil servants and subject to possible tacit administrative sanctions. Also, the courts can be willing participants in a politicized judicial
process, yielding to the temptation of reaching popular results which express their concern for the national interest. Neither of these positions,
however, are tenable given the necessity of an independent and neutral
judiciary in a democratic society.
The French courts have elaborated a jurisprudence which, to some extent, satisfies the need for predictability and consistency in the articulation
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and application of legal norms, despite the lack (until recently) of higher
court review. Starting from the restrictive post-World War II premise that
political offenses encompassed only objective political crimes (for example,
treason), the French courts moved progressively toward the adoption of a
predominance approach which had been applied by the Swiss courts. This
approach consisted of a broad assessment of the political and criminal
elements of an act to determine which element outweighed the other. The
cours d'appel grappled with the problem of terrorist acts using the predominance approach. They have arrived at a reasonably consistent doctrine
although it suffers at times from arbitrary and inconsistent application.
The proverbial black letter of French jurisprudence on the political
offense exception can be summarized as follows. Terrorist acts are criminal
acts, and their grave criminal character precludes any consideration of their
underlying political motivation for purposes of extradition. Even when the
acts are not sufficiently grave or odious, terrorist activities are not quintessentially political crimes, but rather are akin to anarchistic activities-a
social crime for which extradition will lie. This position appears to be the
constant doctrine of the French courts when they function as neutral
arbiters of disputes; it is a stance which merits study and imitation by the
courts of other countries.
The influence of external political circumstances has detracted considerably from the elaboration of this doctrine in certain cases-such as Holder,
Abu Daoud, and the Spanish cases. It is extremely unfortunate that the
French judiciary acquiesced to the dictates of executive branch policies or
willingly gave voice to them in its determinations through unreasoned
pronouncements or by resort to artifically technical analysis. The Linaza
decision illustrates the proper judicial posture in such matters. The decision ought to serve as a model for future French judicial decision-making
in this area.
The blackletter position and the mixed results that have been achieved
in actual French practice, of course, do not cover all of the possible factual
variations that could be encountered in this type of litigation. Assume, for
example, that the potential extraditee took part in the activities of a dissident faction during a period of extreme civil strife in Italy. The group
committed classic terrorist acts, including murder, kidnapping, and arson,
during that period. When a new government finally assumed power and
stabilized the situation, the extraditee fled to France and was apprehended
by French authorities some weeks later. Whether a French court would
consider the acts in question as political offenses in this case is a matter
of speculation. This case might involve an accommodation of the current
predominance approach of the French courts with the Anglo-American
test requiring a two-party struggle for power. 145 Although the hypothetical example goes beyond the guidance proffered by contemporary French
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jurisprudence, it nonetheless points to certain deficiencies in the law of
extradition which center precisely upon the role of the judiciary in the
process.
The definition of the notion of a political offense presents many of the
same issues which are involved in a determination of whether a defense
of soverign immunity and/or act of state is applicable to a particular
litigation. Given the political context of the litigation, one wonders whether the question is justiciable, whether the courts have the expertise or
necessary sensitivity to matters diplomatic to render a ruling. In many
instances, this type of adjudication may raise challenges to the judiciary's
image of neutrality and impartiality. The exigencies of the political process
might overwhelm the usual procedures of judicial adjudication. For example, prior to 1976, in applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the U.S.
courts felt bound by executive determinations. 146
In recent treaty practice in the area of extradition, the United States has
adopted a similar approach in dealing with the political offense exception.
Under the provisions of the newly ratified treaties with the Netherlands
and Colombia, political questions which arise in the process of extradition
are assigned exclusively to the Secretary of State. 147 One commentator has
characterized this approach as "[a] better division of labor" which leaves
"diplomacy to diplomats [and] provides better and speedier justice." 148
However one assesses the merits of such an approach, if it were applied
to the French litigation, it would have the advantage of dismissing any
apprehensions about the neutrality of the courts and their role in reaching
a determination on the political offense question. Extradition, under established dogma, is within the domain of soverign discretion and a government determination of political questions that surface in the extradition
process would only strengthen that view, leaving courts under French law
with the more limited responsibility of supervising the procedural
regularity of the extradition request. There would be no need for the courts
to articulate a conceptual framework by which to define the notions of
political offense and terrorism, to choose between competing tests, and to
ponder the facts of widely divergent cases and the possible non-judicial
consequences of a given determination. The blackletter law would fall into
dissuetude, the mixed results would not need to be reconciled, and the
challenge of the hypothetical example would be confronted by efficient
and appropriately attuned men of state, not judges.
The emerging United States approach obviously has much to recommend it in light of the laborious and sometimes inconsistent results
achieved by the judiciary. The approach clearly represents a radical departure from past practice and, in fact, may be a hurried and unthinking
response to the difficulties presented by the political context of certain
extradition cases. Although it is beyond the scope of the present endeavor
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to assess critically the emerging United States approach, it seems that it
mistakes speedier justice for better justice by undermining any effective
system of checks and balance in the extradition process. While the terms
political offense, terrorism, and mixed crimes may present nearly intractable problems of judicial definition, there is at least some sort of institutional mechanism for guarding against arbitrary and capricious governmental action-though it is not always effective. The history of the
political offense exception shows that its vitality is dependent upon its
application by neutral tribunals which stand above or to the side of the
vicissitudes of political considerations. While efficient and expedient, the
United States proposal appears to be a dangerous infringement upon fundamental safeguards.
This study of the French decisional law illustrates markedly that the
courts of one country have achieved extremely mixed and sometimes
dissatisfying results in repressing international crime. The courts at times
plod their way through cases, respond inappropriately to external pressures, and are unable to maintain a consistent and ascertainable doctrinal
approach in some instances. A sense of political realism and a concern for
the equilibrium of power, however, dictates that that approach, despite its
glaring imperfections, is preferable to unlimited government discretion of
any kind, especially for determinations relating to political questions.

NOTES
1 N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
2 N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1981, at 3, col. 1; id., Dec. 19, 1981, at 3, col. 4; id., Dec. 20, 1981,
at 4, col. 1; id., Jan. 1, 1982, at 3, col. 4; id., Jan. 2, 1982 at 3, col. 2.
3 This article adopts an expansive definition of terrorism, taking the term to encompass
most acts or threats of violence which are ideologically motivated. A precise definition would
surely be helpful, but the difficulty of determining such a definition is indeed one of the
underlying problems of the cases discussed in this article. See infra text accompanying note
12. Another problem is the doubtful ideological motivation of some purported terrorists. See
infra text accompanying notes 90-96.
The International Law Association has proposed the following definition:
The offense of international terrorism shall consist of any act of violence or threat
thereof by an individual or by groups of individuals, however denominated, directed
against internationally protected persons, internationally protected organizations, internationally protected places, internationally protected transportation systems or internationally protected communications systems, with the intention of intimidating
such persons or members of the general public, or of causing injury to or the death
of such persons or of members of the general public who have been seized as hostages
or otherwise singled out as objects of terrorist attack, or causing loss, detriment or
damage to such places or property in order to undermine friendly relations among
States or among the nationals of different States or to disrupt the activities of such
international organizations or such international transportation or communications
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systems or to extort concessions from States, whether committed internally or externally.
The offense shall comprehend conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and complicity in the commission of the offense.
Draft Outline of Single Convention on Legal Control of International Terrorism art. 1(1),
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SEvENTH CONFERENCE 119, 143-44 (1976).
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at 22; Apr.-June 1980, at 29; July 1980, at 14; Aug.-Oct. 1980, at 12; Nov. 1980, at 17;
Oct.-Dec. 1980, at 26.
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Infractions? An Appraisal of Recent French Extradition Cases [hereinafter cited as Terrorist Acts], 3
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law, see Y. CH.uvY, L'EXTRADITION (1981).
11 See supra note 10, for a list of articles that have focused on the decisions of the Paris
Cour d'appel.
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12 See supra text accompanying notes 5-7. To parse a well-known phrase-one country's
criminal terrorist is another country's freedom fighter and political hero. What one juridical
and political culture will perceive as wanton destruction-unjustified and barbaric criminal
conduct-may be, in the perception of another culture, a necessary and laudable act of
reprisal and vindication, redressing long-standing inequities.
In my view, however, the need to repress crime mandates that some limitations be
imposed upon this type of open-ended reasoning. Semantic difficulties should not degenerate
into futile casuistic debates which cloud the pressing need to elaborate a doctrinal framework
by which to deal with the legal implications of terrorism. Political aspirations and cultural
perceptions-no matter how different-need to be maintained within the bounds of civilization. In many instances, acts of terrorism are wanton acts of violence and destruction directed
at innocent targets and victims in the name of some ideological cause which seeks to undo
existing political, economic, and social structures. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism provides an enumeration of paradigmatic terrorist acts. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90,
reprintedin, 15 Iirr'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1272 (1976) (the Convention was designed to be a European
response to the increase in terrorist activities by providing for a unified and firm stance on
matters relating to the extradition of transnational terrorists). The fundamental lawlessness
of these acts, despite any coloration given to them by the motivation of the actors, is their
chief defining characteristic.
13 See The Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 5-10.
14 Id. at 5.
15 See id. at 10-33.
16 Id. at 8-9. This doctrine is known as the Belgian "attenat clause."
17 Id. at 11-16. This doctrine is known as the Anglo-American test.
18 Id. at 17.22. This doctrine was known as the French objective test.
19 Id. at 23-31. This doctrine was known as the Swiss predominance test.
20 Id. at 13, 27.
21 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
22
See id. See also Fleming, Propagandaby the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late NineteenthCentury Europe, 4 TRM 1 (1980).
23
The French system of writing and reporting judicial opinions also has an impact upon
how the relevant data is interpreted and analyzed. In the area of extradition (as in other areas
of the law), the French opinions are reported only in a selective fashion and sometimes
reprinted only in extract form in the case reporters. Also, French judicial opinions, in addition
to their formulaic style, are characteristically brief and succinct; unlike their American analogues, the French judges do not engage in an extensive process of reasoning. Finally, French
courts rule as a unitary public body-there are no dissenting opinions in French court cases.
See, e.g., 0. KAN-FREuND, C. LEvY & B. RUDDEN, A SOURcE-BooK ON FRENCH LAw 275 (2d ed.
1979).
24
The traditional view is that courts decide cases by referring to the Civil or other relevant
Code and to other applicable statutory materials and are not bound by the previous decisions
of other courts ruling in similar cases. In a word, the courts in a civilian system are bound
to do justice in an individual case by reference to the legal principles and rules contained in
the codified and statutory law. See, e.g., H. DavRis, CIvIL LAw AND THE ANGLO-AmERICAN LAwYE
243 (1976); AMos & WALTON, INTRODUCTON TO FRENCH LAw 9-12 (2d ed. 1963).
25 The still-reigning view is that stare decisisis unknown in civilian jurisdictions. It is quite
evident that, were this interpretation of the systemic features of the French civilian system
taken as seriously as it appears to be meant, it would have a considerable impact upon the
elaboration of a coherent and consistent French view of what is meant by a political offense.
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The relevant jurisprudence-in theory at least-could be cast into a total ad hoc doctrinal
disarray.
26
See, e.g., 0. KAHN-FREuND, C. LEVY, & B. RUDDEN, supra note 23, at 284; see generally E. FAYs,
LA CoUR DE CAssATIoN (1970). Although this system of supervision, at times, can become
procedurally very complicated and, given the amount of litigation, must be fairly limited, it
does have the effect of maintaining a quite high degree of consistency and predictability in
the various areas of the private civil and criminal law. See, e.g., AMos & WALTON, supra note
24, at 8-9.
27 Loi du 10 mars 1927, arts. 16-17, 1927 J.O. 2874, 1927 Recueil p~riodique et critique
[D.P. IV] 265.
28 Id.
29 French judges are civil servants subject to transfer to undesirable locations and appellate judges are subject to promotion. See, e.g., H. DEVRIES, supra note 24, at 85-89.
30 See, e.g., Y. CHAUVEY, supra note 10, at 99.
31 See, e.g., H. DEVRIES, supra note 24, at 70, 187.
32 Id. See generally CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE, LE CONSEn. D'ETAT 17991974; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, N. LEECH, THE INrrERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 311-313 (2d ed. 1981).
33 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
34 See id.
35 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
36 Loi du 10 mars 1927, arts. 16-18, 1927 J.O. 2874, 1927 D.P. IV 265.
37 Id.
38 1926 J.O. 1734 (Senate debates of Dec. 10,1926); see also Travers, supra note 9, at 601-02,
609-10.
39
To students of the law, the concept of political offense presents a classically irresolvable
problem of where to draw the line and how to establish meaningful distinctions. Its definition
presents the same difficulty as defining what is meant by a political question which is not
justiciable, see, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONsTrruTIONA. LAw 1619 (9th ed. 1975), or how far the scope
of a sovereign immunity defense is to extend, see e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist.,
55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P. 2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1961); Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d
579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1960). Perhaps a more telling analogy
could be made to the question of negligence in tort law. There the courts have devised a
number of analytical methodologies by which to define the negligent character of an act.
Although doctrinal explanations of negligence vary considerably in quality, one sometimes
has the impression that the doctrine is merely a garb in which to clothe (and hide) a certain
policy determination. See, e.g., The English Law of Products Liability, in THE HARMONIZATION OF
EUROPEAN LAW (P. Herzog, ed. 1982) (forthcoming). In this light, judicial decision-making
smacks of the arbitrary and ad hoc-results are reached despite the limitations of doctrine.
For Cardozo, in many cases, negligence is a question of the foreseeable consequences of
conduct and foreseeable plaintiffs; the scope of the duty, if it exists, is determined by the
foreseeability of the injury. See, e.g., Adams v. Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 (Ct. App.
N.Y. 1919). Other judges and courts have argued that the definition of negligence is a factor
of substantial risk creation: does the defendant's activity present so great a risk of harm that
he must bear the liability for the injuries that flow from his conduct. See, e.g., Bolton v. Stone,
[1951] A.C. 850. The remote chance of the injury occurring and the seriousness of the actual
injury are additional considerations in this negligence-risk equation. See Conway v. O'Brien,
111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
In assessing the value of competing interests, the courts sometimes have explicitly invoked the talisman of public policy: it is in the best interest of society that this conduct be
characterized as negligent to protect the defenseless and to compensate the injured. See, e.g.,
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902). The
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definition of negligence, a legal wrong, becomes estranged from the notion of wrongfulness
and becomes synonymous with the insurance principle and an economic analysis of risk and
cost distribution in society. See generally G. WIrE, TORT LAW IN AERICA (1980). Often, a torts
determination masquerades as a negligence analysis only to become a strict liability Cinderella in the holding and result.
As in the negligence area, the goal of the political offense exception is to isolate and
describe the doctrinal framework in which, and methodology by which, the political or
non-political character of an act is determined. This so-called liability calculus, obviously,
will be influenced to some extent by variations in the factual circumstances of the cases and
the existing political context in which the cases are decided; a principled doctrinal formula,
however, should emerge, although one wonders whether the same or similar words will have
the same meaning in each individual case.
To pursue the analogy to the law of negligence still further, it seems that a number of
negligence-like factors will enter into the consideration of the political character of a given
act. For example, the French courts may look at the consequences of the act and reason that
the substantial risk created by the act to innocent victims minimizes, if not eliminates, the
political coloration of the act. Also, they may take into account the actor's probable state of
mind during the commission of the offense and weigh that factor on its own merits or in
relation to a set of objective criteria. Whatever calculus is used, there remains the possibility,
as in negligence cases, that the selection and application of doctrine will be determined by
considerations outside of the record. The courts may not legislate, but they might act as
spokesmen for an executive branch policy in the cloak of judicial neutrality.
On the one hand, there is an evident need for a stable and generally applicable legal
doctrine: the law should be predictable and consistent. The courts need to be perceived as
neutral arbiters of these questions, although one wonders whether the application of the
political offense exception can ever be divorced entirely from political considerations. On the
other hand, there is a not inconsiderable amount of pressure upon the courts to reach viable,
pragmatic, and politically palatable decisions.
40 Judgment of Apr. 14,1975, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished). See E. Mc DoWELL, DIGEST
oF UNITED STATES PRACricE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (1975) for a discussion of the facts and
holding.
41 Judgment of Jan. 11, 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1977 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey Information
Rapides [D.S.I.R.] 352, 1977 Gazette du Palais [Gaz. du Palais] 105.
42 Judgment of Nov. 7,1979, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished) reprintedin Appendix, this
volume.
43 Judgment of Oct. 17,1979, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished), reprintedin Appendix, this
volume.
44 These cases already have received fairly extensive commentary and analysis. See supra
note 10. For present purposes, it suffices to restate the basic premise of these cases, considering
primarily their doctrinal result. The Cour d'appel of Paris ruled in all these cases and all were
decided during the administration of Val~ry Giscard D'Estaing.
45 Supra, note 40.
46 See E. Mc DowELL, supra note 40, at 168.
47 Id.
48 1977 D.S.I.R. 352, 1977 Gaz. du Palais 105. See also 104 J. Du DR. INTL 843 (1977); Terrorist
Acts, supra note 10, at 284 n.108 and accompanying text.
49 1977 D.S.I.R. 353. See also Abu Daoud, supra note 10; Affaire Abu Daoud, 23 ANuAIRE
FRANgmSE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL [ANN. FR. DE DR. INT'L] 1046 (1977); 22 ANN. FR. DE DR. INT'L

936 (1976) (containing a report and assessment of the Abu Daoud opinion).
50 See Abu Daoud, supra note 10, at 500-13.
51 See supra, note 49.
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Id.

53 See, e.g., The Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 17-22.
54 See id. at 18-22.
5
5Discoursetdilarationsdu Prisidentde la RpubliqueFrancaise,documents supplied by the French
Information Agency {la documentationfrancaise):Doc. No. 36024-Interview Given by Mr. Valry
Giscard d'Estaing to the Italian Television Network (TG1) During the Franco-Italian Talks
in Rome on Friday, January 23, 1981; Doc. No. 20318-Interview Given by Mr. Val~ry
Giscard D'Estaing to the German Magazine "Der Spiegel" on the Situation in Europe at the
Presidential Palace on December 18, 1978; Doc. No. 19190-Press Conference of Mr. Val~ry
Giscard d'Estaing After the Meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen on Saturday,
April 8, 1978; Doc. No. 19179-Interview Given by Mr. Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing to the
French Television Network (TF1) During the European Summit Meeting in Copenhagen on
Saturday, April 8,1978; Doc. Nos. 14769,14775,14776 & 14777-Television Interview of Mr.
Val~ry Giscard d'Estaing with Four Journalists on Wednesday, December 14, 1977. These
various documents consist of declarations of the former French President regarding terrorism
and the need for police and judicial cooperation among European nations. The remarks center
upon the need for the creation of a European Judicial Area, the French willingness to cooperate in these matters, and the denial of any infringement upon liberty interests by this new
form of international cooperation.
The French Information Agency also supplied a number of newspaper reports detailing
the ebb and flow of the French attempt to establish a European Judicial Area. These reports,
taken primarily from Le Monde during 1979 and 1980, emphasize the relationship between
the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and a similar convention
done on December 4, 1979 in Dublin and the French proposal. While the proposal had the
support of the West German and Italian Governments, the project never materialized due to
a lack of consensus among member-States.
See also Charpentier, Vers Un Espace JudiciaireEuroplen, ANN. FR. DE DR. INTL 927 (1978); Terr6,
L 'EspaceJudiciaireEuropien, [1980] REv. EuR. 61; Vallk, A ProposDe La Dicision Du Conseil Constitutionnel Du 17 Juillet 1980, 26 ANN. FR. DE DR. INT'L 202 (1980); Wilkinson, Proposalsfor Government
and InternationalResponses to Terrorism, supra note 6, at 180-86. See generally, New European Tactics on
Terrorists Net 22 in France, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1980 at A3, col. 4.
56 Judgment of Nov. 16, 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished), reprinted in Appendix,
this volume.
57 Judgments of July 9,1980, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished) (Concerning the extradition of Ingrid Barabass and Sieglinde Hofman), reprinted in Appendix, this volume.
58 See supra note 43.
59
See supra note 42. Again, these rulings have received fairly extensive commentary in the
literature, and need be looked at only briefly for purposes of the present analysis. See supra,
note 10. For a discussion of the West German government's responses to terrorism see Note,
Anti-Terrorism: The West German Approach, 3 FORDaAM INt'L L. FORUM 167 (1980).
60 See Extradition and Transnational Terrorism, supra note 10, at 813.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 822.
63 Id. at 820-21.
64 Id. See also Affaire Croissant, 24 ANN. FR. DE DR. INT'L 1130 (1978).
65 Id. at 821-22.
66
See Judgment of July 7,1978, Conseil d'Etat, Paris, 1978 Recueil des dcisions du Conseil
d'Etat [Lebon] 292. See also Terrorist Acts, supra note 8, at 289-91.
67 See Terrorist Acts, supra note 10, at 289-91.
68 This is the so-called force de la chose jugle. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
69 See generally P. HERZOG CIVIL PROCEDURE INFRANCE 413-14 (1967).
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70 See Extradition, 24 ANN. FR. DE DR. INT'L 1074 (1978).
71 Id. at 1076.

72 Id. at 1074.
73 Id.
74 Id.

75 See supra note 32.
76 Judgment of July 27, 1979, Conseil d'Etat, Paris, 1979 Lebon 333.
77 See Extradition, supra note 70, at 1074, 1076.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1074-77.
80 Judgment of December 20, 1978, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished), Appendix, this
volume.
81 The "Black Rescue" (Secours Noir). Id. See also 1980 D.S. Jur. at 449 (conclusions of M.
Labetoulle, Commissaire du Government).
82 Appendix, this volume.
83 Id.
84 Id. (author's translation).
85 Judgments of July 9, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished) (concerning the extraditions of Ingrid Barabass and Sieglinde Hofman), reprinted in Appendix, this volume. See also Le
Monde, May 8, 1980, at 13, col. 1; id.; May 9, 1980, at 13, col. 2; id., June 11, 1980 at 12, col.
1; id., June 27, 1980, at 10, col. 5.
86 Id.
87 Id. The warrants alleged that the fugitives belonged to separate terrorist groups (Barabass to the "June 2 Movement" and Hofmann to the "Red Army Faction"), but contended
that they had both participated in the kidnappings.
88 Id. What is required of the requesting state in this context is stated in the provisions
of the applicable extradition treaty: for example, that the charge for which extradition is
sought is an extraditable offense under the treaty, that the extradition request be made
pursuant to a validly drawn arrest warrant and through appropriate diplomatic channels.
89 Judgment of Nov. 16, 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished), reprinted in Appendix,
this volume. See generally supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
90 Judgment of Dec. 13, 1978, Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence (unpublished), reprinted in
Appendix, this volume.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93 Judgment of July 3, 1967, Cour d'appel, Paris, Juris. Classeur periodique, la semaine
juridique U.C.P.] II, No. 15274. See also The Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 20-21.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Abu Daoud, supra note 10, at 503.
97 See supra notes 37, 38. See also Terrorist Acts, supra note 10, at 291-96.
98 See supra notes 42-43.

99 Judgment of June 7, 1978, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished) (concerning the extradition of Antonio Bellavita), reprinted in Appendix, this volume.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 80-88.
101 See supra note 99.
102 See supra notes 42-43.
103 See The Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 10.
104 Judgment of
, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished). See Le Monde, Dec.
16, 1980, at 12, col. 3. The charges against Pinna also included drug trafficking. The court
postponed consideration of the extradition request for Pinna's wife. Both Pinna and Bianco
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were wanted for charges relating to a robbery committed in France before they were apprehended, allegedly perpetrated to finance left-wing groups in Europe. Depending upon
what action the French Government takes on this matter, the extraditees could be tried before
the Couer de sfreti de l'Etat on the robbery charge before being extradited. The robbery was
committed in Cond6-sur-l'Escant and involved some sixteen million francs. See id. See also id.,
Oct. 10, 1980, at 12, col. 4.
105 Judgment of Sept. 5, 1980, Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence (unpublished). See also Le
Monde, Sept. 2, 1980, at 9, col. 1; id., Sept. 21, 1980, at 11, col. 2; id., Sept. 6, 1980, at 10, col.
1; id., Sept. 7-8, 1980 at 16, col. 2 (reviewing the history of the case, reporting the extradition
proceedings, and analyzing the extradition decision).
106 Le Monde, Sept. 2, 1980, at 9, col. 1.
107 Id.
108 Id., Sept. 7-8, 1980, at 16, col. 2 (author's translation).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. (author's translation).
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 Loi du 10 mars 1927, art. 5(2), [1927] J.O. 2874, 2880, 1927 D.P. IV 265, 266-67.
117 See Terrorist Acts, supra note 10, at 275-97.
118 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
119 Judgment of June 24, 1977, Conseil d'Etat, Paris, 1977 Lebon 290, 1977 D.S. Jur. 699;
see also Terrorist Ads, supra note 8, at 279-97 (discussing the decision in the context of other
recent French extradition cases); 105 J. Du DR. INT'L 73, 76 (1978) (criticizing the decision on
two grounds: (1) that it is inconsistent with the terms of France's 1877 extradition treaty with
Spain, and (2) that it goes too far in finding an underlying political purpose in the Spanish
request for extradition); 24 ANN. FR. DE DR. IT'L 1074 (1978) (discussing the same two issues
more neutrally).
120 1977 D.S. Jur. at 695 (conclusions de M. Gerevois, commissaire du Government).
121 1977 D.S. Jur. at 699 (conclusions de M. Genevois).
122 1977 Lebon at 290. See also 1977 D.S. Jur. at 699 (conclusions de M. Genevois).
123 1977 Lebon at 290, 1977 D.S. Jur. at 695-699.
124 Judgment by May 30, 1979, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished), reprintedin Appendix,
this volume.
125 Id.
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128 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
129 Judgments of April 6 and May 15, 1979, Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence (unpublished), reprinted in Appendix, this volume.
130 Judgments of April 6 and May 16, 1979, Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence (unpublished), reprinted in Appendix, this volume.
131 See supra notes 129-130.
132 Id.
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"Homeland, Basque, Liberty." It designates a group seeking autonomy of the Basque region
from Spain-a group which often employs terrorist tactics.
134 See supra notes 129, 130.
135 Although the earlier Henin and de Palma cases exhibited a fairly liberal application of
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the notion of political offense, they were exceptional in the evolving French jurisprudenceattesting more to the demise of the Gatti objective offense approach than anything else. See
Terrorist Acts, supra note 10, at 277-80.
136 Judgment of July 8, 1981; Cour d'appel, Pau (unpublished). See also Le Monde, July
10, 1981, at 29, col. 1 (describing how the decision, coming in the midst of Franco-Spanish
efforts to reach an agreement concerning antiterrorist cooperation, has complicated relations
between the two countries).
137 Le Monde, July 10, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
138 See supra note 136.
139 Judgment of June 3, 1981, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished). See also Le Monde, June
5, 1981, at 14, col. 2; id.,
June 9, 1981, at 8, col. 4; id., June 10, 1981, at 1, col. 6, 7, col. 1; id.,
July 2, 1981, at 6, col. 2; id., July 5-6, at 3, col. 5; id., July 8, 1981, at 4, col. 1 (emphasizing
the political repercussions of the government's decision not to extradite Linanza).
140 See Le Monde, June 5, 1981, at 14, col. 2.
141 Judgment of June 3, 1981, supra note 129.
142 See Le Monde articles, supra note 129.
143 Id., July 5-6, 1981, at 3, col. 5.
144 For an assessment of Franco-Spanish relations in these extradition matters and on the
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